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Criminal Law
by Franklin J. Hogue*
and Laura D. Hogue"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year we selected a small number of significant cases and
amendments to Georgia criminal law on which to focus this Survey!
This narrower focus allows slightly more in-depth treatment within the
space limitations and may be more useful, so we hope, to practicing trial
lawyers in the ever-changing area of criminal law.
II.

PRETRIAL ISSUES

A.

Right to Counsel
In 2002 in Alabama v. Shelton,' the Supreme Court of the United
States mandated that the right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth

* Partner in the law firm of Hogue & Hogue, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Faculty, National
Criminal Defense College; Adjunct Faculty, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of
Law. Atlanta Christian College (BA, magna cum laude, 1980); Emmanuel School of
Religion (M.A., summa cum laude, 1983); Georgia State University (MA., summa cum
laude, 1988); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1991).
Member, State Bar of Georgia; Past-President, Macon Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers; Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member, National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
** Partner in the law firm of Hogue & Hogue, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Faculty, National
Criminal Defense College; Adjunct Faculty, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of
Law; Adjunct Faculty, Columbus College. Columbus College (B.A., cum laude, 1986);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1991).
Member, State Bar of Georgia; Chair, Amicus Committee, Georgia Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers; Macon Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
1. For analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see Franklin J.
Hogue, CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 61 MERCER L. REV. 79 (2009).
2. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution,' required the appointment of counsel to any person who could face a sentence of incarceration,
including a sentence in which the term of imprisonment was to be
probated because the probation could one day be revoked." The Georgia
Supreme Court followed suit, stating "that absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no indigent person may be imprisoned for any offense,
or sentenced to a probated or suspended prison term, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."'
During this reporting period, the question arose in Alford v. State"
whether this directive applied retroactively. In 1995 Alford was
convicted of DUI and of being a minor in possession of alcohol following
a bench trial in Muscogee County, Georgia. The trial judge sentenced
him to twelve months probation. Some time after the Supreme Court of
the United States' decision in 2002, Alford filed a petition for habeas
corpus challenging the validity of his plea and conviction because he was
not provided appointed counsel. The habeas court denied the petition,
finding that Alford was not entitled to appointed counsel because he was
not sentenced to any term of imprisonment.' The Georgia Supreme
Court granted a certificate of probable cause to review the habeas court's
order, expressly to determine whether Alabama v. Shelton' should be
applied retroactively to Alford, as he was unrepresented by counsel.'
In deciding whether a case should be applied retroactively, the court
must first determine whether the rule announced by the new case is,
indeed, a "new rule" or simply a declaration of a rule "dictated by
precedent [that existed] at the time the [appellants] conviction became
final."o The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the holdings of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the South
Carolina Supreme Court that concluded Shelton did apply retroactively
because it was a "new rule."" Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court
likewise announced that Shelton must be applied retroactively in
Georgia." For Alford, though, this was not the end of the inquiry.

3. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
4. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 664, 672-74.
5. Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499, 501, 570 S.E.2d 277, 279 (2002).
6. 287 Ga. 105, 695 S.E.2d 1 (2010).
7. Id. at 105, 695 S.E.2d at 2.
8. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
9. Alford, 287 Ga. at 105, 695 S.E.2d at 2.
10. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989).
11. Alford, 287 Ga. at 106, 695 S.E.2d at 3 (citing Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d
1068, 1081 (11th Cir. 2004); Talley v. South Carolina, 640 S.E.2d 878, 882 (S.C. 2007)).
12. Id. at 108, 695 S.E.2d at 4.
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Retroactive application of a rule on collateral-as opposed to direct-review (a habeas corpus petition being collateral) is limited to only
two situations: (1) if the new "rule places certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe," or (2) if it "requires the observance of those
procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty as it directly affects the accuracy of the
conviction and "alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.""' The denial of the
habeas petition was reversed, and Shelton will be applied retroactively.'5
With only one dissent,16 the Georgia Supreme Court opinion reminds
us of the letter penned by Clarence Earl Gideon to the United States
Supreme Court in January 1962 in which he wrote, "The question is very
simple. I requested the court to appoint me attorney and the court
The next year, the Supreme Court of the United States
refused."
declared in its landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,8 "reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
This seems to us to be an obvious truth.""

B. Search and Seizure
1. Search Incident to Arrest. In Simmons v. State," John Henry
Simmons Jr. was riding in the backseat of his friend's Buick when they
pulled into the parking lot of a fast food restaurant. A police officer
recognized the car because the day before he had discovered that it was
not registered or insured. Armed with that information, the officer
arrested the driver as the driver walked from the car toward the
restaurant. He then ordered the front seat passenger and Simmons out
of the car so that he could search it. The officer found a small amount

13. Talley v. South Carolina, 640 S.E.2d 878,882 (S.C. 2007) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S.
at 311) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Alford, 287 Ga. at 107-08, 695 S.E.2d at 4.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 108-11, 695 S.E.2d at 4-6 (Carley, P.J., dissenting).
17.

ANTHONY LEWIs, GIDEoN's TRUMPET 82 (Vintage Books ed. 1989) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19. Id. at 344.
20. 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (2009).
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of marijuana in the armrest between the front seats. He then arrested
Simmons, handcuffed him behind his back, and put him in the back seat
of a patrol car.21
An officer drove Simmons to jail while Simmons sat alone in the back
seat.22 After placing Simmons in jail, the transporting officer then
searched the back seat of his patrol car and found a paper bag wedged
into the seat with "79.67 grams of a substance containing 72.4 percent
cocaine."'
Simmons was indicted and convicted for trafficking in
cocaine after losing a motion to suppress the drug evidence against
him.'
Recognizing that Simmons lacked standing because he had no
possessory interest in the car itself or anything inside it, the Georgia
Court of Appeals concluded that Simmons could challenge the search
anyway because his argument was that he was illegally detained during
the search.'
The court then discussed its holding in the driver's
appeal.26 Relying on New York v. Belton," the court held that after
having legally arrested the driver, the officer was authorized to search
the car and any containers in it incident to the arrest of the driver.'
After the court had reached this conclusion in the driver's case, however,
the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Arizona v.
Gant." The Court's decision in Gant limited its decision in Belton by
holding that the police may "search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search." Thus, the court of appeals remanded Simmons to the trial
court to reconsider its denial of Simmons's motion to suppress in light
of Gant.'
2. Collateral Estoppel in Search and Seizure. In Thackston v.
State," a Douglas County, Georgia judge placed Hulon Thomas

21. Id. at 21-22, 681 S.E.2d at 713-14.
22. Id. at 22, 681 S.E.2d at 714.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 21-22, 681 S.E.2d at 713-14.
25. Id. at 26, 681 S.E.2d at 716-17.
26. Id. at 26, 681 S.E.2d at 717.
27. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
28. Simmons, 299 Ga. App. at 26, 681 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Swicord v. State, 293 Ga.
App. 545, 547, 667 S.E.2d 401, 403 (2008)).
29. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
30. Simmons, 299 Ga. App. at 26, 681 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719
(2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 26-27, 681 S.E.2d at 717.
32. 303 Ga. App. 718, 694 S.E.2d 136 (2010).
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Thackston Jr. on probation in 2001 for distribution of methamphetamine. In March 2007, Paulding County, Georgia law enforcement
stopped Thackston for a traffic violation, searched his car and his
person, and found methamphetamine in his pants. Paulding County
charged him with the new offense of possession of methamphetamine
while Douglas County issued a probation arrest warrant for the new
crime."
In October 2007, while executing the probation arrest warrant at
Thackston's Paulding County home, officers found more methamphetamine, this time on Thackston's kitchen table. Using that discovery, the
officers acquired a search warrant for Thackston's house and then found
more methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Paulding County then
charged Thackston with trafficking in methamphetamine. Douglas
County subsequently amended its petition to revoke probation by adding
the drugs found in Thackston's house to the drugs found in his pants
during the traffic stop.'
In the Paulding County case, Thackston moved to suppress the drugs
from both the traffic stop and the house search." The trial court
granted Thackston's motion, finding that the traffic stop search violated
Thackston's Fourth Amendment" privacy right and that the house
The
search "had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree."
Paulding County prosecutor did not appeal the trial court's decision and
dismissed the pending drug case."
Thackston then filed an identical motion to suppress in the Douglas
County case along with a plea in bar." In the plea in bar, Thackston
asserted that the State was precluded from pursuing a probation
revocation because the successful motion to suppress in Paulding County
settled the matter of the legality of the searches and seizures for
Douglas County as well.40 He based his position on the common law
doctrine of collateral estoppel, a doctrine that "applies where an issue of
fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment."" Further, "[tihat
determination is then conclusive in a subsequent action between the

33. Id. at 718-19, 694 S.E.2d at 137.
34. Id. at 719, 694 S.E.2d at 137-38.
36. Id. at 719, 694 S.E.2d at 138.
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
37. Thackston, 303 Ga. App. at 719, 694 S.E.2d at 138.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 720, 694 S.E.2d at 138.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Dickerson, 247 Ga. App. 812, 813, 545 S.E.2d 378, 380
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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same parties. 42 The probation court in Douglas County disagreed,
denied the motion to suppress, and revoked Thackston's probation."
The court of appeals reversed the probation court, holding that
Thackston's case involved the same issues of fact and law in both
Paulding and Douglas Counties, that these issues were actually litigated
in Paulding County, that the determination of the legality of the
searches was essential to resolving the motion to suppress, and that both
cases "involved the same parties-Thackston and the State."" In
reaching this result, the court reversed two of its cases that held that
the State could relitigate a motion to suppress in a subsequent probation
revocation matter.'5
3. Inadmissible Confession: Hope of Benefit. In Canty v.
State," Tara Marquez was working outside as a carhop at the local
Sonic Drive-In one night when she noticed four males in the dim light.
Fearing that something bad was up, she began to run for the back door
of the restaurant. The four men chased her, and one of them grabbed
her shirt just as she escaped into the restaurant. She could not identify
any of them.
About seven months later, two detectives interviewed Alfonzo Canty,
who was in the Bulloch County, Georgia jail on charges unrelated to the
attempted robbery at the Sonic. Neither detective gave Canty the
Miranda warnings,' which have been standard in custodial interrogations since 1966." One of the detectives, Katrina Marson, "asked
Canty if he knew anything about the attempted robbery at the Sonic.""

42. Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Dickerson, 247 Ga. App. 812, 813, 545 S.E.2d 378, 380
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 720-21, 694 S.E.2d at 138-39.
45. Id. at 723, 694 S.E.2d at 140 (reversing Harvill v. State, 190 Ga. App. 353, 378
S.E.2d 917 (1989), and Aikens v. State, 143 Ga. App. 891, 240 S.E.2d 117 (1977)).
46. 286 Ga. 608, 690 S.E.2d 609 (2010).
47. Id. at 608-09, 690 S.E.2d at 610.
48. Id. at 609 & n.1, 690 S.E.2d at 610 & n.1.
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Id. at 444.
50. Canty, 286 Ga. at 609, 690 S.E.2d at 610.
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Without implicating himself at first, Canty said he believed that Levi
and Lenzie Wilkerson were in on it."
Marson read Canty's demeanor to indicate that he was involved in the
Sonic robbery attempt. Accordingly, she began to encourage him to tell
all by explaining to him that he could "hope for a shorter term" if all his
criminal behavior-including the crimes for which he was being held and
the Sonic crime-were wrapped up together and handled at one time by
the district attorney. Additionally, Marson told Canty that the district
attorney would receive a favorable report from Marson about Canty's
cooperation if he went ahead and told on himself. Motivated by
Marson's encouragement, Canty confessed to his role in the Sonic

crime.5 2
Under Georgia law, section 24-3-50 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.)P requires that to be admissible at trial against
the defendant, a confession "must have been made voluntarily, without
being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest
fear of injury."" Further, "[tihe promise of a hope or benefit that will
render a confession involuntary under [O.C.G.A.I § 24-3-50 must relate
to the charge or sentence facing the suspect." The "hope of benefit"
alluded to in the statute is generally construed to mean hope of lighter
punishment.' It was clear to the Georgia Supreme Court-though not
so clear to the trial court and the Georgia Court of Appeals, both of
which concluded that Canty's confession was voluntarily given-that
"Canty's confession was induced by a hope of benefit."
As a consequence, Canty's confession "must be 'presumed to be legally falsel and
cannot be the underlying basis of a conviction.'""
III. OPEN COURTROOM
It seems a cardinal rule in American jurisprudence that every
individual is entitled to have his case tried in a courtroom open to the
public. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution"
provides that "[ln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

51. Id.
52. Id. at 609-10, 690 S.E.2d at 610.
53. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (2010).
54. Id.
55. Canty, 286 Ga. at 610, 690 S.E.2d at 611 (quoting White v. State, 266 Ga. 134, 134,
465 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 608, 610-11, 690 S.E.2d at 610-11.
58. Id. at 610-11, 690 S.E.2d at 611 (quoting State v. Ritter, 268 Ga. 108, 109, 485
S.E.2d 492, 494 (1997)).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The Georgia Constitution likewise

mandates that "[iun criminal cases, the defendant shall have a public ...
trial."e2 Yet it took a trip all the way to the Supreme Court of the
United States to remind the court in DeKalb County that this constitutional directive is not discretionary.
In Presley v. State," the defendant was tried for the offense of
trafficking in cocaine. When voir dire began, the judge directed that the
defendant's uncle wait outside the courtroom because the courtroom had
limited seating. Trial counsel objected, arguing that the court was
violating the defendant's right to a public trial by excluding the public
from the courtoom during voir dire.' The trial court denied the
motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.' The court applied an
abuse of discretion standard and held that the trial court gave legitimate
reasons for needing to clear the courtroom for voir dire and that the
court was prepared to let the spectators return after jury selection.'
It appears that the trial court and the court of appeals considered the
issue simply within the framework of the trialjudge's ministerial role in
making decisions about courtroom security and comfort and did not
consider the broader inquiry of whether these decisions were infringing
upon constitutional rights."
Presley sought and was granted certiorari on this single issue by the
Georgia Supreme Court." The supreme court identified this issue as
one of constitutional significance, safeguarded by the Sixth and
The
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.'
supreme court acknowledged that the right to a public trial extended to
jury voir dire and jury selection.' In order to exclude the public from
jury selection, the supreme court noted, "[Tihere must be 'an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader
than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider

60. Id.
61. GA. CONST. of 1983 art. I, § 1, para. 11(a).
62. 290 Ga. App. 99, 658 S.E.2d 773 (2008).

63. Id. at 99-100, 658 S.E.2d at 775.
64. See id. at 100-01, 658 S.E.2d at 775.
65. See id
66. See generally Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722 (2010) ("[It's up to the
individual judge to decide ... what's comfortable.... It's totally up to my discretion
whether or not I want family members in the courtroom to intermingle with the jurors and
sit directly behind the jurors where they might overhear some inadvertent comment or
conversation.").
67. Presley v. State, 285 Ga. 270, 270, 674 S.E.2d 909, 910 (2009).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Pedey, 285 Ga. at 272, 674 S.E.2d at 911.
69. Presley, 285 Ga. at 272, 674 S.E.2d at 911.
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reasonable alternatives to closing the [courtroom], and it must make
findings adequate to support the closure" 70 The supreme court
concluded that the trial court must have legitimately believed there was
no reasonable alternative to closing the courtroom and that the defense
counsel's request for accommodations, which would have enabled
Presley's uncle to remain in the courtroom, was too "nebulous."n The
supreme court put the burden on the defense counsel to provide a
specific alternative to courtroom closure for the trial court to consider. 2
Defense counsel failed to do so; therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in failing to sua sponte advance its own alternatives to
courtroom exclusion.
Justice Sears wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Hunstein. 4
The dissent put the burden squarely back upon the court, stating, "A
room that is so small that it cannot accommodate the public is a room
that is too small to accommodate a constitutional criminal trial."'5 The
dissenting justices pointed out that the only decision that made the
courtroom too small to accommodate the public was the trial court's "sole
decision" to conduct voir dire with all forty-two potential jurors in the
courtroom at the same time.
The Supreme Court of the United States accepted the case on
certiorari." The Supreme Court first noted from the record that there
was certainly enough room for both the jurors and the spectators to be
seated in the courtroom.'" The Supreme Court criticized the majority
decision by the Georgia Supreme Court, noting that "despite [the
Supreme Court's] explicit statements to the contrary," the Georgia
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court need not consider
alternatives to closing the proceeding absent an opposing party's proffer
of some alternatives." Yet the mandate of Waller v. Georgia' and
Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court of California,Riverside County"
was clear: it is the trial court's duty to consider alternatives to closing
the courtroom; thus, there is no burden placed upon the opponent to

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)).
Id. at 272-73, 674 S.E.2d at 911.
See id, at 273, 674 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 274, 674 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 724.
467 U.S. 39 (1984).
464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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come up with those alternatives.12 Further eviscerating the Georgia
Supreme Court opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States sided
with Justices Sears and Hunstein in challenging any defense of closing
the courtroom during voir dire based upon a broad, nonspecific risk of
jurors hearing prejudicial remarks.' The Supreme Court noted that
such concerns are present in every instance of voir dire in a public
courtroom, meaning that the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion essentially "permit[ted] the closure of voir dire in every criminal case ...
whenever the trial judge decides .. . that he or she would prefer to fill
the courtroom with potential jurors rather than spectators."'
IV. VENUE
In every criminal case, the state must prove the essential element of
venue-that the crime occurred in the county in which the case is being
tried.' Many new prosecutors learn this the hard way by resting and
then hearing the trial judge grant the defense's motion for directed
verdict of acquittal because the prosecutor failed to ask the all-important
question: "and Detective, in what county did that occur?" Perhaps
fearing that result, a trial judge in Muscogee County began assisting the
state in making sure that this critical fact did not go unproven. These
nudges by the judge resulted in two very different outcomes.
In Gardner v. State,' the State was prosecuting Gardner for the
offense of armed robbery." After the State's direct examination of its
first witness, the following exchange took place:
State: That's all we have, Judge.
The Court: Prove venue. Did you prove venue?
State: I have not as of yet.
The Court: Why don't we go ahead and do that before we forget it.8 8
On appeal, Gardner asserted that pursuant to O.C.GA. § 1 7 -8- 5 7 ,8
this exchange constituted an improper comment on the evidence by the

82. Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 724 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 48; Press-Enterprise,464 U.S.
at 511).
83. Id. at 725.
84. Id. (quoting Presley, 285 Ga. at 276, 674 S.E.2d at 913 (Sears, C.J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 901, 537 S.E.2d 80, 83 (2000).
86. 296 Ga. App. 792, 676 S.E.2d 258 (2009).
87. Id. at 792, 676 8.E.2d at 260.
88. Id. at 793, 676 S.E.2d at 261.
89. O.C.G.A. § 17-57 (2008). "It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during
its progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has
or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused." Id.
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court." The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed, noting that what
escalated the error was the trial court's selection of the word "we"
instead of "you"-"[w]hy don't we go ahead and do that before we forget
it"-which implied that he was aligned with the state instead of an
impartial arbiter.91 The court of appeals held that the directive of
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 that prohibited the trial court from commenting on
the evidence is mandatory; therefore, a violation of this rule required
reversal and a new trial for Gardner.92
But that wasn't the end of the story. The State sought and was
The first question the Georgia Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
addressed was whether, as the State argued, the defense had waived its
challenge to the trial court's comment by failing to object at trial." The
supreme court held "that a violation of [O.C.G.A.] § 17-8-57 will always
constitute 'plain error,' meaning that the failure to object at trial will not
waive the issue on appeal." The supreme court expressly disapproved
of previous cases that had not clearly articulated the court's position."
Nevertheless, the supreme court reversed (albeit with a two-member
dissent), holding that while it "strongly discourage[s] the giving of
direction or the use of language that could create the appearance of
alignment between the trial court and either the prosecution or defense,"
the trial judge's inquiry into whether venue had been proved did not
constitute a comment on the evidence. 97 The two-member dissent stood
by the court of appeals conclusion that the trial court's inquiry into
whether venue had been proved was necessarily an expression of the
judge's opinion concerning the state's proof and should have required
reversal."
Despite the supreme court's holding in Gardner,the court of appeals
in Anderson v. State" held differently." Anderson involved another
armed robbery trial (though this time with an added financial transac-

90. Gardner,296 Ga. App. at 793, 676 S.E.2d at 260.
91. Id. at 793, 676 S.E.2d at 261 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 794-95, 676 S.E.2d at 262.
93. State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634, 690 S.E.2d 164, 165 (2010).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (disapproving of Lopez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 618, 625, 677 S.E.2d 776, 781
(2009); Sims v. State, 296 Ga. App. 368, 369-70, 674 S.E.2d 392, 394-95 (2009); and
Birkbeck v. State, 292 Ga. App. 424, 434-35, 665 S.E.2d 354, 363-64 (2008)).
97. Id. at 635, 690 S.E.2d at 166.
98. Id. at 635-36, 690 S.E.2d at 166 (Hines, J., dissenting).
99. 297 Ga. App. 733, 678 S.E.2d 498 (2009).
100. CompareGardner,286 Ga. 638, 690 S.E.2d 164, with Anderson, 297 Ga. App. 733,
678 S.E.2d 498.
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tion--credit card fraud) in the same county as Gardnerand before the
same trial judge (only six weeks later). In this trial, during the
testimony of one of the state's witnesses, the trial judge asked, "Did we
establish venue on this one?"'' The following exchange then took
place:
STATE: I asked her if it was in Muscogee County.
THE COURT [to the witness]: The store where you were working on
the 13th where the shoes were bought using the transaction card was
in Muscogee County, is that accurate?
[WITNESS]: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. I know we had some confusion because she
had worked at one store and she's now working in another one. I just
wanted to make sure.'0o
The court of appeals held that the trial judge had violated O.C.G.A.

§ 17-8-57 by improperly expressing his opinion on what had been proved,
just as he had in Gardner." Noting that the defense's failure to
object at trial did not waive the error because the trial court's remarks
constituted plain error, the court of appeals reversed the conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial.OM But for Anderson the outcome
was quite different than for Gardner.
Again the State took the case up on certiorari to the supreme
court.' The supreme court's opinion was issued two months after the
opinion in Gardner.1 06 This time the supreme court held that the trial
judge's comments did improperly constitute an expression of opinion that
venue had been proved in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57. o7 The
distinction that the majority of the court drew between its decisions in
Gardner and Anderson was the line, "I just wanted to make sure.""
This statement, the supreme court held, unequivocally expressed an
"opinion that venue had in fact been proven."" The two justices who
dissented in Gardner concurred specially in the opinion in Anderson,
making it clear that they did not see any critical distinction between the
impropriety of the trial judge's comments in both cases and maintained

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
8.E.2d
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 734, 678 S.E.2d at 500.
State v. Anderson, 287 Ga. 159, 160, 695 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2010).
Anderson, 297 Ga. App. at 735-36, 678 S.E.2d at 500-01.
Id.
Anderson, 287 Ga. at 159, 695 S.E.2d at 27.
CompareAnderson, 287 Ga. 159, 695 S.E.2d 26, with Gardner,286 Ga. 633, 690
164.
Anderson, 287 Ga. at 160-61, 695 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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their opinion that the reversal by the court of appeals in Gardner'scase
should have also been affirmed.110
V.

AMENDMENTS IN RESPONSE To DECIsIONs

The Short-Lived Defense of Consent
For sex offenses against children, consent is never a defense because
Georgia law presumes that until a person reaches the age of sixteen, he
or she is unable to give legal consent to engaging in sexual activity."'
For sex offenses against persons over the age of sixteen, the law requires
that the sexual offense be non-consensual in order to be criminal except
One of those circumstances had been
in certain circumstances."'
sexual offenses between teachers and students." That dynamic was
altered in Chase v. State;" however, the change was short-lived.
Melissa Lee Chase was a high school physical education teacher"'
who was convicted at a bench trial of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5.1116
for having committed the offense of sexual assault against a student.117
She was sentenced to ten years in prison followed by five years of
probation and was required to register as a sex offender.u8 The
offense arose out of her consensual sexual relationship with a sixteenyear-old female student."' The evidence was uncontroverted that the
student began the relationship with Chase and still had romantic
feelings toward her even after the prosecution and conviction. Chase
argued on appeal that consent remained a viable defense under the
statute governing this offense.120
Chase's argument rested on the express language of O.C.G.A. § 16-65.1, which has three sections: (a), (b), and (c).' 2 ' Section (a) sets forth
all the definitions (what is a "sexual offense," what constitutes "intimate
parts," what behavior equates with "psychotherapy," and so forth). 22

A.

110. Id. at 161, 695 S.E.2d at 28 (Hines, J., concurring specially).
111. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(a) (2007).

112. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(aXl) (2007).
113. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5.1(b) (2007).
114. 286 Ga. 693, 681 S.E.2d 116 (2009).
115. Chase v. State, 293 Ga. App. 415, 417, 667 S.E.2d 195, 197 (2008).

116. O.C.GA § 16-6-5.1 (2007).
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Chase, 293 Ga. App. at 415, 667 S.E.2d at 196.
Chase, 285 Ga. at 694-95, 681 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 694, 681 S.E.2d at 117.
Chase, 293 Ga. App. at 417, 667 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 417-18, 667 S.E.2d at 197; see O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5.1(a)-(c).
O.C.GA § 16-6-5.1(a).
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Section (b) sets forth the offense of sex with a probationer or parolee or
sex with a student as follows:
A probation or parole officer or other custodian or supervisorofanother
person referred to in this Code section commits sexual assault when he
or she engages in sexual contact with another person who is a
probationer or parolee under the supervision of said probation or parole
officer or who is in the custody of law or who is enrolled in a school or

who is detained in or is a patient in a hospital or other institution and
such actorhas supervisoryor disciplinaryauthorityover such otherperson.1 23

Section (c) addresses sexual assault with a person over whom the actor
has supervisory or disciplinary authority when the person is in the
actor's custody or when the person is detained in a hospital or institution."
It is under this section-section (c)-that there are three
subsections: 1, 2, and 3." It is under section (c)(3) that the consent
language appears: "Consent of the victim shall not be a defense to a
prosecution under this subsection."26 Chase's argument was that the
legislature eliminated consent as a defense with respect to only those
acts described in subsection (c)."' Chase argued that sex with a
student appeared only in section (b) and, therefore, consent was a viable
defense."
The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed her convic-

tion.129
The supreme court granted certiorari to address this issue."o
Applying all the tried-and-true rules of statutory construction, the
matter boiled down to one question: "Did the [clourt of [aippeals err in
ruling that subsection (c)(3) of [O.C.G.A.] § 16-6-5.1 applies to prosecutions under subsection (b) of the statute?""3 ' The language of the
statute was clear and unambiguous-"[Tlhe General Assembly intended
to eliminate consent as a defense to the crimes created by subsection (c)
only."'32 The supreme court reasoned that the trial court and court of
appeals made a public policy leap to apply one subsection's limitations

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. § 16-6-5.1(b) (emphasis added).
Id § 16-6-5.1(c).
Id. § 16-6-5.1(cX1)-(3).
Id. § 16-6-5.1(cX3) (emphasis added).
See Chase, 293 Ga. App. at 418, 667 S.E.2d at 197.
See id. at 417-18, 667 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 418, 667 S.E.2d at 197.
Chase, 285 Ga. at 695, 681 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 695, 681 S.E.2d at 117-18.
Id. at 697, 681 S.E.2d at 119.
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to another, characterizing those decisions as nothing more than "judicial
sleight of hand."" The conviction was reversed."
But the Georgia General Assembly was listening. Effective May 20,
2010, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5.1 was rewritten.as The various offenses
contained in the statute were more specifically defined, and most
significantly, there was a new section (e) that reads, "Consent of the
victim shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this Code section."'3 e

B. Kidnapping: The Slight Movement Standard
On a related note, in direct response to the supreme court's holding in
Garza v. State," the General Assembly amended the kidnapping
statute covered in last year's criminal law survey.'s In Garza the
supreme court overruled the "slight movement" standard in assessing
what conduct could satisfy the asportation element of the offense of
kidnapping.13 9 Instead, the supreme court held that for asportation to
sufficiently form the basis for the offense of kidnapping, the factfinder
must assess four factors: "(1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether
the movement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3)
whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense;
and (4) whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to
the victim independent of the danger posed by the separate offense."
As a result, Garza's kidnapping conviction was reversed."'
The legislature responded. Effective July 1, 2009, O.C.G.A. § 16-5The new
4042 was amended to undermine the Garza holding."
legislation amends section (b)(1) of the statute to read as follows: "For
the offense of kidnapping to occur, slight movement shall be sufficient;
provided, however, that any such slight movement of another person
which occurs while in the commission of any other offense shall not

133. Id.
134. Id. at 699, 681 S.E.2d at 120.
135. Ga. H.R. Bill, 571, § 2, Reg. Seas., 2010 Ga. Laws 168 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-65.1 (Supp. 2010)).
136. O.C.GA § 16-6-5.1 (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
137. 284 Ga. 696, 670 S.E.2d 73 (2008).
138. See Hogue, supra note 1, at 94-96.
139. 284 Ga. at 701-02, 670 S.E.2d at 78.
140. Id. at 702, 670 S.E.2d at 78 (relying upon the test articulated in Gov't of the Virgin
Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1979)).
141. Id. at 704, 670 S.E.2d at 79.
142. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40 (Supp. 2010).
143. Ga. H.R. Bill 575, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 331 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40).
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constitute the offense of kidnapping if such movement is merely
incidental to such other offense.'"
VI.

SENTENCING

First Offenders
It is error to disqualify an individual who is serving a sentence under
the First Offender Act'" from serving as a prospective juror."
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b)(5)" provides that in felony jury trials, the
state or the accused may object to the seating of a juror who "has been
convicted of a felony in a federal court or any court of a state of the
United States and the juror's civil rights have not been restored."'"
In a case of first impression, the supreme court in Humphreys v.
State"9 was asked to consider whether that statute applied to individThe supreme
uals serving a sentence under the First Offender Act.'
court noted that the juror disqualification statute expressly applies to
those who have been convicted of a felony offense, and the First Offender
Act expressly provides for punishment "without entering a judgment of
guilt."'' Accordingly, the supreme court "conclude[d] that a person
who has been placed on probation or sentenced to a term of confinement
pursuant to the First Offender Act is not incompetent to serve as a petit
juror under [O.C.G.A.] § 15-12-163(b)(5) either before or after being
discharged without an adjudication of guilt."52
A.

B. Death Penalty
On interim review of a death penalty case, the supreme court in Pope
v. State' addressed the question of whether the trial court could order
a psychological evaluation of the defendant over his objection.'5
During the pretrial phase of the case, "[tihe trial court repeatedly
inquired of defense counsel if they anticipated presenting expert mental

144.
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147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(bXl).
O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-60 to -66 (1997 & Supp. 2010).
Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 71, 694 S.E.2d 316, 327 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(bX5) (2008).
Id.
287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (2010).
Id. at 69, 694 S.E.2d at 326.
Id. at 70, 694 S.E.2d at 326-27; see O.C.GA. § 42-8-60(a).
Humphreys, 287 Ga. at 71, 694 S.E.2d at 327.
286 Ga. 1, 685 S.E.2d 272 (2009).
Id. at 3, 685 S.E.2d at 274.
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health testimony at trial."" The defense "repeatedly responded that
they had no present intention of doing so" but assured the trial court
that they would advise the court if and when they made any decision to
seek a mental health examination of their client.156 The trial court
was very concerned that defense counsel might forego an evaluation,
only to have a mental retardation claim raised in later habeas corpus
proceedings. So over defendant's objection, the trial court ordered the
defendant to undergo a competency and mental retardation evaluation.
The court also ordered that a copy of the report be provided to the State
after defense counsel had reviewed it and advised the trial court of the
findings and whether they related to the underlying case. 5 7
In the next hearing, the State informed the trial court that it had
instructed Central State Hospital not to provide the State with a copy
of the report, so the State had not seen the report. At that time, the
defense made a copy of the report and provided it to the trial court.
There was no further discussion regarding the State's access to that
report.xsa
The law does place a duty upon the trial court to conduct sua sponte
a competency hearing "when there is information which becomes known
to it, prior to or at the time of the trial, sufficient to raise a bona fide
doubt regarding the defendant's competence."5" The problem here, the
supreme court reasoned, was that the trial court's motivation in ordering
the mental evaluation was not a concern for the defendant's competence
but was instead "solely for the purpose of ensuring that claims regarding
This
mental health are not eventually raised on habeas corpus.""
AmendFifth
motivation is not sufficient to trump the defendant's
ment'6 1 right to remain silent and to protect his privilege against selfincrimination. 62 The supreme court ruled that the trial court's order
for the psychological evaluation was an error and ordered that the report
be kept under seal unless the defense elected to present any mental
health expert testimony at defendant's trial."e

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4, 685 S.E.2d at 274-75.
Id. at 4, 685 S.E.2d at 275.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Pope, 286 Ga. at 3-4, 685 S.E.2d at 274.
Id. at 4-5, 685 S.E.2d at 275.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Criminal law and constitutional law, which go hand in hand, are
dynamic and ever-changing fields of study thanks to the work of creative
practitioners (many of whose cases are highlighted in this Article) who
have challenged the status quo to help develop and define the landscape
within which prosecutors and defense attorneys implement our criminal
justice system.

